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Amid frenzied national responses to COVID-19, the 
world could soon reach a critical juncture to revisit 
and strengthen the International Health Regulations 
(IHR), the multilateral instrument that governs how 
196 states and WHO collectively address the global 
spread of disease.1,2 In many countries, IHR obligations 
that are vital to an effective pandemic response remain 
unfulfilled, and the instrument has been largely side-
lined in the COVID-19 pandemic, the largest global 
health crisis in a century. It is time to reimagine the 
IHR as an instrument that will compel global solidarity 
and national action against the threat of emerging 
and re-emerging pathogens. We call on state parties to 
reform the IHR to improve supervision, international 
assistance, dispute resolution, and overall textual clarity.
First, the COVID-19 pandemic highlights long-
standing challenges in the identification of a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). 
The IHR obliges states to notify WHO of any event that 
may constitute a PHEIC within 24 h after public health 
authorities’ assessment.2 Evidence indicates that some 
public health authorities in Wuhan, China, suspected 
what later became known as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 for several weeks before 
WHO was privy to the information.3 Without legal 
authority to independently visit China and review the 
outbreak situation, WHO faced a barrier in mounting 
a cogent global response. In a reimagined IHR, states 
should allow for information to be received from 
non-state actors without being subject to verification 
from the state in question, as currently required by 
the IHR.2 Moreover, national accountability should 
be strengthened by mandating independent experts 
to conduct missions to states so that they can review 
potential outbreak situations. Arms control treaties 
bear the strongest examples of such inspection 
mechanisms, but they have also been wielded in other 
realms of global health, principally the international 
drug control regime.4 The concrete links between 
infectious disease control and global security provide 
a compelling rationale for an inspection mechanism 
that encourages states to be more forthright and 
accountable in reporting a potential PHEIC.5
Relatedly, the process for declaring a PHEIC must be 
revisited. In a reimagined IHR, states should call for 
transparency in the deliberations that lead to a PHEIC, 
by publishing, for example, the transcript of discussion 
that led to the declaration of a PHEIC.6 Transparency 
would enhance accountability in the IHR process. 
Furthermore, states should consider replacing the 
rigid binary PHEIC architecture, whereby the decision 
is either no PHEIC or a PHEIC, with an incremental 
mechanism that would enable intermediate stages 
for IHR-based alerts and guidance.7 This change would 
enable greater flexibility and global coordination in 
responding to disease outbreaks as they unfold. 
Second, COVID-19 has shown that all states must 
invest more domestic resources in their public health 
systems. Following more than a decade under the 
revised IHR, only a third of countries meet the core 
capacities of public health systems required therein,2 
impacting countries’ abilities to prevent, detect, and 
respond to disease outbreaks and putting “the whole 
world at risk”.8 However, even in states where public 
health core capacities are deemed strong, public health 
responses to COVID-19 are woefully inadequate.9 
Strengthening public health core capacities in all 
countries demands the concretisation of global solidarity 
and international support in our shared vulnerability 
to pathogens.10 States should consider bolstering the 
IHR provisions for international assistance, including 
incorporating a financial mechanism to assist low-
income countries in building and sustaining required 
capacities.
To ensure accountability for national capacity building, 
states should integrate an effective reporting mechanism 
to monitor implementation of IHR obligations. Robust 
reporting procedures generally require states to submit 
periodic national reports on the measures adopted, 
progress made, and problems encountered in the 
implementation of a treaty and, crucially, to incorporate 
some type of independent review. Periodic reporting 
procedures assist states in identifying and alleviating 
obstacles they face when implementing commitments, 
without criticising their performance. International 
monitoring is crucial for treaty implementation in a wide 
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range of fields and can be imagined as a key mechanism 
to catalyse cooperation in a post-COVID-19 world. The 
absence of any provision for such monitoring in the 
IHR hampers its effectiveness and relevance.
Third, the COVID-19 pandemic confirms how disrup-
tive health measures can be for trade, transport, and 
economic activities.11–13 Disputes over the legality 
of such health measures are likely, and agreed 
mechanisms to settle them would prevent political 
tensions from becoming disruptions. Some disputes 
lend themselves to longer judicial processes, but many 
would benefit f rom p rompt a nd p ractical m echanisms 
of resolution. The IHR provides a range of options, 
but these have never been publicly used.2 Multilateral 
dispute resolution processes, including consultation 
forums among concerned states and an active good 
offices role by the WHO Director-General preceding the 
dispute resolution process, could provide pragmatic 
solutions.
Fundamentally, states must tackle the overarching 
issue of ambiguity in the text of the regulations in 
any future IHR reform process. The widespread lack 
of clarity with respect to key state obligations in the 
current IHR undermines compliance by producing a 
“zone of ambiguity within which it is difficult to  sa y 
with precision what is permitted and what forbidden”.14
There will soon come a time when negotiators 
will meet to reimagine the IHR or devise a new legal 
instrument to promote global cooperation to address 
infectious disease outbreaks and other global health 
threats. The challenge should be met head on, not 
squandered or hidden behind a veil of ambiguity so 
that a strengthened IHR is better equipped to respond 
to future global health challenges and acts as an 
instrument for global solidarity.
ALT was a legal adviser at WHO and a consultant to WHO on global health law 
matters. GLB reports personal fees from WHO Regional Office for Europe for 
consultancy on governance and procedural questions; the fees relate to a 
consultancy on the governance of the Office and the procedures of the Regional 
Committee. SD is a member of the WHO research ethics review committee. 
ME-T previously worked as a consultant to WHO on unrelated matters. 
AP reports grants and personal fees as past and current consultant to WHO on 
global and public health law matters, including the IHR. SJH is Scientific Director 
of the Institute of Population and Public Health at the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR) and the agency’s Scientific Co-Lead for the COVID-19 
Rapid Research Response. The views expressed in this Comment are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their affiliated institutions. 
RH, LOG, BMM, PAV, AEY, DC, LF, GO, and SS declare no competing interests. 
*Allyn L Taylor, Roojin Habibi, Gian Luca Burci, 
Stephanie Dagron, Mark Eccleston-Turner, 
Lawrence O Gostin, Benjamin Mason Meier, 
Alexandra Phelan, Pedro A Villarreal, Alicia Ely Yamin, 
Danwood Chirwa, Lisa Forman, Gorik Ooms, 
Sharifah Sekalala, Steven J Hoffman
taylora8@uw.edu 
School of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA (ALT); 
Global Strategy Lab, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada (RH, SJH); Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland (GLB); 
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland (SD); Keele University, Keele, UK 
(ME-T); O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, DC, USA (LOG, AP); University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA (BMM); Center for Global Health 
Science and Security, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, 
USA (AP); Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law, Heidelberg, Germany (PAV); Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA 
(AEY); Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa (DC); 
Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, USA (LF); 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK (GO); and School of 
Law, Warwick University, Coventry, UK (SS)
1 Ghebreyesus TA. WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the World 
Health Assembly. World Health Organization, 2020. https://www.who.int/
dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-
world-health-assembly (accessed June 15, 2020).
2 WHO. International Health Regulations, WHA 58.3, 2nd edn. Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2005.
3 Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, et al. Clinical features of patients infected with 
2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. Lancet 2020; 395: 497–506.
4 Taylor AL. Addressing the global tragedy of needless pain: rethinking the 
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. J Law Med Ethics 
2007; 35: 556–70.
5 UN Security Council. Security Council Resolution 2177 (2014). 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_RES_2177.pdf (accessed June 15, 2020). 
6 Eccleston-Turner M, Kamradt-Scott A. Transparency in IHR emergency 
committee decision making: the case for reform. BMJ Glob Health 2019; 
4: e001618.
7 Harvey F, Ammar W, Endo H, et al. Interim Report on WHO’s response to 




8 Global Preparedness Monitoring Board. A world at risk: annual report on 
global preparedness for health emergencies. September, 2019. 
https://apps.who.int/gpmb/assets/annual_report/GPMB_
annualreport_2019.pdf (accessed June 15, 2020).
9 Aitken T, Chin KL, Liew D, Ofori-Asenso R. Rethinking pandemic 
preparation: Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is predictive of COVID-19 
burden, but in the opposite direction. J Infect 2020; published online 
May 10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinf.2020.05.001.
10 Taylor A. Health. In: Oxford handbook of United Nations treaties, 1st edn. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019: 339–54.
11 World Trade Organization. Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic 
upends global economy. 2020. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
pres20_e/pr855_e.htm (accessed June 17, 2020).
12 World Bank. Global economic prospects. Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-
prospects (accessed June 17, 2020).
13 International Civil Aviation Organization. Effects of novel coronavirus 
(COVID-19) on civil aviation: economic impact analysis. 2020. 
https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Pages/Economic-Impacts-of-
COVID-19.aspx (accessed June 17, 2020).
14 Chayes A, Chayes AH. The new sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998.
